Nowadays, third Generation (3G) 
Introduction
The Internet is expected to converge into a single network interconnecting increasingly more heterogeneous networks, as wireless and cable networks. Due to this convergence and new emerging applications such as multimedia, the network will deal with services with a large range of quality of service (QoS) requirements. This is combined with an increasing number of subscribers demanding a particular bandwidth. If the user demand is below network capacity, like in the Internet backbone, then congestion does not occur and there is no special need for applying service differentiation since all QoS requirements will be likely satisfied. On the other hand, in access networks in general [I], and in wireless communications in particular, capacity will be hardly increased, and the increasing demand needs to be managed in a way that "most" of demands are satisfactorily served. In this situation, it seems important to apply control and/or service differentiation procedures. In this paper, we focus on direct-sequence code-division multipleaccess (DS-CDMA) networks that form the next generation of wireless networks [17] . DS-CDMA is indeed a way to control QoS, by appropriately selecting the transmission powers, so they can be increased when the interference increases in order to satisfy the requested signal qualities. We consider the case of integrated services, that are supported in DS-CDMA, where multiple classes of service are provided (through different prices and received powers at the base station). We assume perfect power control at the base station, which is known to be crucial especially for the reverse-link ( [14] ): all signal powers of mobile users received at the base station are thus forced to be equal within a given class, avoiding near-far effects for instance.
Several papers have been devoted to power allocation and QoS management [6] [7] [8] 121 . In these works, resource allocation schemes are proposed to provide the best possible QoS levels to clients, but they do not look at practical ways of controlling demand. To tackle out this problem, pricing is a simple and convenient approach. Pricing has been extensively studied in wired networks such as the Internet for controlling congestion and for differentiating services ( [2, 3, 16] ). Pricing has also been used in CDMA networks (see, among others, [lo, 13,151 ) by using their specificities: the price charged to a user is computed in terms of the QoS degradation imposed to others by this user, the so-called externality. This can be shown to directly depend on the transmission powers through the interferences. This generally leads to a game-theoretical analysis and price optimization.
We consider in this paper a different view of CDMA network control where prices do not depend on power or interference levels, but simply on the volume of transmitted data. Also, we look for a static pricing scheme, where prices are fixed and do not vary with the network conditions. As in [I I], we believe that users would prefer to have an a-priori knowledge of the applied charge rather than a dynamic and random one, even if this is larger in average.
We thus consider a pricing mechanism to optimize the network revenue in reverse-link DS-CDMA transmissions. The model we propose is inspired by the one in [6] , where an optimal resource allocation scheme was obtained among different classes of users, but for a fixed and pre-determined number of users in each class. In [6] , power is controlled to reach the given thresholds of signal-to-interference plus noise ratio (SINR) for which QoS requirements are met. A processing gain exhibiting good performance is computed. We consider here that the processing gain is fixed for each class of service. Besides, we compute the received powers allowing to optimize the network revenue. Our goal, with respect to [6] , is to study how pricing can be used to control the number of users in the network and how, by means of pricing and received powers, the provider's revenue can be optimized. The introduction of demand with respect to prices and perceived QoS levels is obtained by introducing utility functions. These functions depend on both the QoS parameters and prices. QoS parameters vary with the type of traffic considered, for instance data is sensitive to delay, while voice is rather sensitive to losses and throughput, if delay is bounded. The better the quality, the more users will access the network, but the higher the prices, the less users will likely enter the network. We thus look at this trade-off as well as the trade-off with received power. The pricing problem is investigated when one or two different classes of traffic are involved. We consider situations where demand always exceeds capacity, as well as cases where demand is random. The random case catches, for instance, the demand behavior over a full day since demand may be under capacity at some point of time. At a given time, we look for an equilibrium situation where demand adapts itself to prices as well as to received power requirements. Then, we look at prices and powers optimizing the provider's revenue. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the basic model taken from [6] , and then describe how demand varies with QoS and prices by using utility functions. Section 3 describes the case of a single class of users and Section 4 does the same analysis but in the case of two classes. Finally, we conclude and give our directions for future research in Section 5. Proofs are left to appendices to ease the understanding of results.
Model

CDMA Model
where the chip rate R, is assumed to be equal for all users.
We assume a multiclass system, with C classes, where a user is characterized by class i. When packets are sent, they enter a buffer after error control coding through forward error correction (FEC), and they are converted to a DS-CDMA signal at symbol rate Rc/Ni, with Ni being the class-i processing gain (which should not be larger than R,/(XiLi)). Li is the length in terms of symbols (or bit of data here) of packet of class i and X i is the rate of the (Poisson) arrival stream of packets. We assume perfect power control, that is, for each class i, the signal transmission power is controlled by the base station such that it is received at level Pi. The choice of Ni and received power Pa at the base station affects packet delay and transmission rate. This has been extensively discussed in [6] . Note that this also affects the performance of other classes of users.
So, we fix the values of Ni to those giving good performance in [6] . We consider that a new packet is generated as soon as the preceding one is successfully delivered. This is referred as contirzuously active users, which might represent the transmission of long files for instance.
In DS-CDMA, a key parameter is the received signal-tointerference plus noise-ratio (SINR). QoS mettics such as delay and bit error probability depend directly on it. For class i users, the SINR is where y is a constant which depends on the shape of DS-CDMA chips, K j is the number of class j connections and a2 is the background noise power.
For all classes of traffic, we assume that channel coding includes forward error correction (FEC). We assume that the bit error probability (BEP) is an exponentially decaying function of the SINR. Specifically, we assume that for a user in class i, the BEP is pb, = F ( S I N & ) , with 3 ( x ) = exp(-,Ox)'. Similarly, the probability of retransmission is
with ri the FEC code rate for class i.
Performance measures can be directly expressed in terms of the SINR. Consider for instance the mean packet delay E D i for type-i traffic. It is composed of the mean waiting time in the queue lEWi and the mean retransmission time E S i , lEDi = EWi + E S i . It is shown in [6] that
The model we propose is based on the one in [6] (with notations fitting better our model). We focus on the reverse link of a single cell. We consider a DS-CDMA network '1n [63, a function F ( x ) = n e x p ( -o x ) is rather used, implying that the delay of transmission is bounded even if the power is reduced to zero. To prevent this degenerated case, we adopt the approach used in [4] , where IE = I SO that the probability of retransmission is equal to one when the power is zero.
On the other hand, base stations also have constraints on capacity. As stated in [17] , for dynamic range limitations on the multiaccess receiver and to guarantee system stability, the total received noise plus interference power to background noise ratio is limited for a class-i user to where q is typically 0.25 or 0.1. This inequality provides an upper-bound on the number of users for each class, for fixed received powers.
Modelling users' behavior
Let the class index i be in { v , d), where v could be for voice traffic and d for data. We abusively use this notation to keep in mind that class-v is more sensitive to some QoS metrics (like delay) than class-d. The index is simply skipped when only one class is considered.
In general, a utilityfunction Ui is associated with a user of class i (i E { v , d)), describing his level of satisfaction when uansmitting a packet. This utility function is expressed as the difference between the value of the QoS level (a function fi depending on the SINR, which is itself function of the number of users of each type Kv and K d ) and the per-packet charge ui for class i:
Assumption 1 We assume that fi is strictly increasing, differentiable and such that fi(0) = 0 Vi ' i {d, v).
We will specifically assume that the utility function for class-i traffic (i E {d, v ) ) depends on the mean delay by where a i is the sensitivity parameter of class-i traffic to the mean delay (as considered in
We assume, at least in a first step, that the number of potential sources is very large so that demand exceeds capacity. Selfish class i users apply for service as soon as their utility Ui is positive. Demand is thus directly controlled by prices and reception powers, so that it potentially leads to a (Nash) equilibrium on the number of active users where, for each class, either the number of sources is zero with negative utility (meaning that no user has interest in participating), or is equal to capacity with positive utility (meaning that no more users are allowed to enter for physical reasons), or the number of sources is positive and less than capacity, with null utility (meaning that the users' cost reach their valuation and no other user has interest in entering, since it would lead to a negative utility). Formally, an
Either K: = 0 and Ui(1, Kj") < 0; or K: has reached capacity constraint (4) (so the inequality becomes an equality) and Ui (K,' , K i ) > 0;
or Kl > 0, under (4), and Ui(KG, K i ) = 0 so that no other user has an incentive to join (a potentially leaving user being immediately replaced by a new one).
This leads to two different problems that we try to solve in the following sections:
What is the steady-state number of sources for fixed prices and reception powers? Is there a (unique) equilibrium, especially when considering two different classes of users in competition?
What are the prices and powers that the service provider should set in order to maximize his revenue?
Optimal pricing for a single class of users
We consider in this section that the system has a single class of users. We first analyze the case where demand always exceeds capacity, then the case where demand is random and may at some point be under capacity.
Demand exceeding capacity
General utility function
The utility function is to be U (
where f is positive, continuous, differentiable, strictly increasing and is such that f (0) = 0 (Assumption 1).
The next theorem (proved in Appendix A) gives the number of sources at equilibrium in terms of price and power.
Theorem 1 Let u be the per-packet price and P be the received power at the base station for all users. The number of users K' at equilibrium is:
The first and third cases are border situations: the first case corresponds to the situation where access is too expensive for users, the third case to the situation where full power capacity is reached.
With the number of sources determined, the second step is to look for per-packet price and received power maximizing the revenue of the base station:
with p(u, P ) the average throughput for each user and K * ( u , P ) the equilibrium number of sources determined in the above theorem. The average throughput is the average number of bits successfully transmitted per second, i.e.
The next theorem (proved in Appendix B) gives the price and received power optimizing the base station revenue.
Theorem 2 Let X be the set of solutions of the following
The per-packet price u* and receivedpower P: maximizing the revenue are
Utility function depending on the average delay
Assume now more specifically that the valuation of users depends on the average delay as & (as used in [5]). So, the utility is (2) and (3) . Note that this function is positive, continuous, differentiable, strictly increasing and is such that f ( 0 ) = 0. Theorems 1 and 2 can be be restated as follows (see Appendix C).
Corollary 1 Under the assumption that the utility function depends on the average packet delay:
K" at equilibrium, as a function of ( P , u), is
Let X " be the unique positive solution of the equation
The optimal per-packet price and received power are and N = 10. We also consider the upper bound of the power ratio 77 = 0.2. Corollary 1 gives the optimal perpacket price u* = 0.4804 and the optimal received power P* = 2.1352. The maximal revenue is R* = 411.699. The revenue is displayed in Figure 1 in terms of the per-packet price u and the received power P ; it can be observed that this is in agreement with the optimization results.
Random demand
We assume now that demand varies so that, during a portion of time, it does not exceed capacity. It is expressed by a discrete random variable A representing the number of potential users requesting service. The goal is again to determine the fixed price u and power P (remember that we look for a static pricing) that maximize the expected base station revenue. To reach this goal, we first need to look at the number of users for each possible level of demand (exceeding capacity or not), whatever the choice of u and P.
Theorem 3 Let u and P be the per-packet price and received power at the base station. Let 6 be the number of users potentially requesting service. The actual number of number of users K* at equilibrium is K* = min(b, K*), with K * being the value defned in Theorem 1.
The proof of this theorem is in Appendix D.
The average base station revenue is expressed by:
where IS* (u, P, 6) (resp. p(u, P, 6)) is the number of open connections (resp. the throughput) when per-packet price is u, received power is P and potential demand is 6. The goal of the base station is, again, to find a price u and a power P that maximize the expected revenue, representing this revenue over long periods of time. For instance, assume that demand A follows a Poisson distribution with rate 3, the other parameters being the same than for the example when demand exceeds capacity. By using standard optimization tools we get the optimal values u* = 0.4905, P* = 2.2694 and the maximum average revenue E* = 299.2589. This is sketched in Figure 2 . 
Optimal pricing for two classes of users
Consider now two different classes of applications with different quality of service valuation for which we want to differentiate services. For convenience, these classes are called type-v and type-d. Here again, we assume that the service valuation for each type of application depends of the S I N E obtained, by fi(SINRi(K,, Kd)) Vi € {v, d}. Therefore, if ui ( is the per-packet price for type-i (Vi E {v, d)), the utility functions are
The S I N R s are given by Vi, j E {v, d), j # i and, as it can be readily checked, the utility function of a type of users depends on the number of active users of the other type.
Again, we assume that there is a capacity constraint at the base station for each class, given by (4). Therefore,
1-77 u2
Kv < ---
Kv < --- 
Demand exceeding capacity
We again first assume that the number of users potentially applying for service is infinite in each type of application. We assume users act selfishly and apply for service as soon as their utility is positive. Also, they leave the game if their utility becomes negative. Again, as in the single class case, the base station blocks connections from users if capacity constraint (8) is reached.
The following theorem (proved in Appendix E) shows that a Nash equilibrium exists for the number of users of each type, when considering that all users are selfish. ( 9 ) and Ud(0,l) 5 0 * ud > fd ( y), no user is interested in requesting service, so that (KG, Kz) = (0,O).
Theorem 4 With the above assumptions, there is a (Nash
1. I f u v ( l , o ) 5 0 * U, 2 f,
2.
IfU,(l, 0) < 0 * Uv > fv (9) but Ud(0,l) > 0, only type-d users are present at equilibrium and the Nash equilibrium is (0, K:) with
otherwise. The revenue is thus maximized when there is only one class of user in the system at equilibrium. This result is based on the strong assumption that potential demand always exceeds capacity. Though, it is likely that at some point of time, demand is less than capacity. This occurs for instance during the evening. In the next section, we assume that demand follows a random variable, and we keep the idea of having static (fixed) prices (as well as received powers). (8) ( and potential demand   constraints (a,, d d ) The proof follows exactly that of Theorem 4, just adding demand constraints 6, and Sd to capacity constraints.
Random Demand
As an illustration, we look at the case where demand follows a Poisson distribution with rate 2 for type-v traffic and 3 for type-d,Nd = 10, NV = 8, ad = 1.6 and a, = 2. This choice gives the optimal values u : = 0.638, u; = 0.484, P,* = 2.635, Pi = 2.177 and maximum average revenue R* = 504.836. We plot Figure 3 ) the average revenue in terms of P, and u, with optimal type-d parameters (the other case gives similar curves). The same thing is performed in Figure 4 , but with varying prices. The figures are in accordance with the optimal value found.
Conclusions
We have investigated in this paper a new pricing scheme for DS-CDMA communications, allowing service differen- tiation. With respect to the schemes developed in the literature, we have chosen a static and predictable per-packet price that, we believe, is more likely to be accepted by users. The base station (assuming perfect power control) controls two variables per class: the price and received power. For fixed values, we have found the number of users applying for service at equilibrium, whatever demand is. We have also looked at the price and power values that maximize the revenue at the base station. Our findings show that, when demand exceeds capacity, one type of service will get the priority. On the other hand, assuming a more likely random demand, we have illustrated that both classes will be served.
As extensions of our results, we would like to look at the case where users are not continuously active, but their activity follow a random variable [6] .
A. Proof of Theorem 1
We consider that the per-packet price u and received power P are fixed. The goal is to find an equilibrium number of sources K* such that no additional users will have an incentive to join the system. This K* is such that 
above which the number of sources is less than what capacity allows. If this is not verified, If the price is higher than this threshold, capacity is reached, leading to the third equilibrium case described in the theorem (new customers are not allowed to enter when their utility is positive).
B. Proof of Theorem 2
The base station revenue is R(u, P) = uK*(u, P)p(u, P). From Theorem 1, we have 3 subdomains for the expression of K* in terms of (u, P).
In the region of (u,p) such that f ( 9 ) < u < f (9) (where users get null utility), K*(u, P ) = 1 -2 , , -& s from Theorem 1. Inserting this in the expression of the average throughput (5) we get This function is continuous and differentiable in both of its variables and it is easy to check that Vu, P Therefore, the revenue over the domain f (y)
such that P = 6 fP1(u), i.e., u = f (y), meaning that price and power are configured such that full capacity is reached.
In the region such that f (9) > u (full capacity reached and positive utility meaning that no other user is allowed to enter), Theorem 1 gives K*(u, P ) = 1 + 9 $ leading to the expression of the revenue:
This function is also continuous and differentiable such that 3 (u, P) > 0. Again, a maximum over this region is necessarily at a point (u, P) on the border, such that u = f (NPv/u2), meaning a null utility. Defining X = y r l , the revenue can be rewritten as
Denoting by X the set of solutions, we get the theorem. . Proof Define F ( X ) = a x 2 + bX + 1 -ex. We have 
D. Proof of Theorem 3
The per-packet price and the received power are fixed to u and P. Assume that, at a given time, the potential number of users is 6. There are several situations: If 6 = 0, there is no demand, so that the actual number of users n* is n* = 0.
If 6 > K * (K* being the equilibrium value when demand exceeds capacity), assume that there are already K customers in communication. If K < K * (resp. K* < K 5 S), the number of active sessions increases (resp. decreases) exactly in the same way as in the case where demand exceeds capacity (see the proof of Theorem A) since users have a positive (resp. negative) utility, so that finally n* = K * . 
E. Proof of Theorem 4
The proof studies different cases. ( 9 ) and Ud(0,l) 5 O * ud > fd (w), no user has interest in requesting service when the base station is idle since an entering user will get a negative utility. Additionally, knowing that Ud and U, are decreasing functions in both of their variables K , and K d , this result also holds for all couple (K,, Kd). Therefore, (K,", K:) = (0,O). The base station decides which users to accept and which users to reject. We follow here the policy that the base station chooses users that will result in a larger revenue. The revenue is using relation (15), where the throughputs are and do not depend on Kd and KO. The revenue is thus linear in Kd and the optimal value depends on the sign of udp; -uvp& 2. 
+ pV). the curve
Ud(Kv, Kd) = 0 is the lowest one. Then users enter the system until this curve is reached. Yet, type-v users have positive utility, so they continue to enter. At the same time, the utility of type-d users becomes negative so that some of them leave. We therefore slide on the curve Ud(Ku, Kd) = 0 until Kd = 0. Then K, still increases until capacity is reached or U,(K,, Kd) = 0. The equilibrium is thus (K;, 0) with K; defined in (10). 
